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ABSTRACT
The article considers strategic defense and attack of a system consisting of N functionally identical parallel elements
of n types distinguished by element’s performance. The elements can be separated in order to reduce the damage
caused by an outside attack. The defender distributes its resource between separation and protecting the elements
from attacks. The attacker attacks optimally. The vulnerability of each element is determined by a contest between
the defender and the attacker expressed as a contest success function. Ten propositions are developed with and
without resource constraints to show when separation is efficient. With two different types of elements, the defender
can never justify separation by maintaining its contest success against the attacker for one type of elements. To
possibly justify separation, the contest success must be decreased against one type and increased against the other
type. For the case of two types of elements a condition is developed for the highest separation cost the defender is
willing to incur if it chooses not to protect any of the elements of type 1. Without resource constraints, separation is
not efficient if the unit costs of protection are equal for all elements, and the unit costs of attack are the same for all
elements. However, separation is efficient if lower unit costs of defense can be obtained through the separation
process for sufficiently many of the elements, especially those elements with high performance, or if the number of
elements of the same type is large.
Keywords: Risk, survivability, vulnerability, reliability, optimization, defense, attack, protection, separation, contest
intensity, game theory, non-homogeneous system.
BASIC DEFINITIONS
Performance — quantitative measure of task performing intensity of element or system (capacity, productivity,
processing speed, task completion time etc.)
Element — lowest-level part of system, which is characterized by its vulnerability and performance
Vulnerability — probability of destruction
Protection — technical or organizational measure aimed at reduction of destruction probability of system elements
in the case of attack
Separation — action aimed at preventing simultaneous destruction of several elements in the case of single attack
(can be performed by spatial dispersion, by encapsulating different elements into different protective casings,
by using different power sources etc.)
1. INTRODUCTION
Determining risk reduction strategies applying reliability theory have usually assumed a static external threat [7,
14, 15, 17, 18, 19]. Bier and Abhichandani [4] and Bier et al. [5] assume that the defender minimizes the success
probability and expected damage of an attack [7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19]. Levitin [16] determines the expected damage
for any distribution of the attacker’s effort and any separation and distribution of the defender’s effort. The September
11, 2001 attack illustrated that major threats today involve strategic attackers. There is a need to proceed beyond
earlier research and assume that both the defender and attacker of a system of components are fully strategic
optimizing agents [8, 10, 13, 20, 22, 27, 28].1
This article considers systems like power generators, water supply systems, telecommunications systems, or
more generally any complex system characterized by some kind of cumulative performance. A system consists of N
functionally identical2 parallel elements of n types with different performance. The elements can be separated and
protected. The defender distributes its resource between separation and protecting the elements from outside attacks.
This gives N contests between the defender and attacker. Separation is, and should also be, a rightfully acknowledged
and standard practice for reducing system risk in the face of intentional attacks and non-intentional impacts, see
[17, 21, 26]. The separation is aimed at preventing the simultaneous destruction of several elements in the case of
a single attack. It can be performed by spatial dispersion, by encapsulating different elements into different protective
casings, by using different power sources, etc. The protection is a technical or organizational measure aimed at the
reduction of the destruction probability of system elements in the case of attack.
The protection of elements of the same type is the same. The attacker attacks optimally. The vulnerability of
each element is determined by a contest between the defender and the attacker. The contest is expressed as a contest
success function modeled with the common ratio form.
Each element is assumed to either work at a nominal performance or be destroyed (electronic devises, mechanical
equipment etc.). This is realistic since multi-state systems that can work with different performance rates can
usually be decomposed into two-state elements (for example, steam generator’s capacity can vary depending on
availability of heating sections which can be made dichotomous).
The article studies the system from the reliability diagram structure point of view. The developed propositions
should be considered as technical aspects that support the decision making process when the system defense is
planned. The article analyzes how protection and separation in a parallel non-homogeneous system are influenced
by strategic optimal behavior of a defender seeking the system to function, and an attacker seeking the system to
malfunction.
In order to clearly understand this influence and simplify the initial study, we assume completely rational
agents which constitutes a fine benchmark. Future research can introduce various mental level behavioral assumptions
such as boundedly rational agents. Furthermore, the article assumes that both the defender and attacker have complete
information about the structure of the game, the strategy sets (which specify the ranges for the free choice variables),
and all parameters. The later also constitutes a benchmark. In practice, the attacker may not be fully informed about
the characteristics of the system, and the agents may not be fully informed about each other’s unit costs. For
example, the attacker may have compiled partial intelligence, may be partially informed, and may even in direct
physical attacks not always be able to validate the exact sizes of all parameters. Modeling incomplete information
about parameters is left for future research.
We believe that more complete models considering incomplete information and taking into account psychological
aspects can be developed further based on the presented  benchmark Empirical validation of the results is also left
for future research, which can be done applying the experimental approaches normally used in decision theory.
Section 2 presents the model and analyzes separation with resource constraints for the defender and attacker.
Section 3 introduces utility maximization with resource constraints. Section 4 considers utility maximization without
resource constraints and without separation. Section 5 incorporates separation. Section 6 assesses the separation
efficiency when defender and attacker act optimally without resource constraints. Section 7 concludes.
2. ANALYZING SEPARATION WITH RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
We consider a system consisting of N functionally identical parallel elements. The total cumulative performance of
the parallel elements in the system is G. If no separation is imposed, a single successful attack destroys the entire
system. For the special case that all elements are identical, the system can be separated into N independent identical
elements with performance g = G/N each. That is, for this special case each element can perform the same function
as the system, but with N times smaller performance. A single successful attack on the separated system can destroy
only one element, and cause system cumulative performance reduction from G to G(N–1)/N.
Generally, the system consists of n types of elements characterized by different performance. One example is a
power generating system composed from n types of generators with different capacity. The number of elements of
type i is Ni such that
1
.
n
i
i
N N
=
∑ =  The total system performance is equal to the sum of performances of the elements.
Each element of type i has performance gi. The total performance of the elements of type i is Nigi. The total system
performance is G =
1
n
i
i
N
=
∑ gi. In order to reduce the expected damage caused by an attack the defender can separate
the system into N elements and protect each one of the separated elements.
The total attacker’s fixed resource is R. The total defender’s fixed resource is r. The defender’s resource is
distributed between separation s and protection r–s. The defender’s strategic decision variable is s. The defender’s
strategy is to determine whether the separation cost s justifies separation when the objective is to minimize the
expected damage. That is, there exists an upper acceptable separation cost s which justifies separation for the
defender. In order for the defender to justify the separation cost, he must furnish a contest success on each element
that in an overall sense is sufficiently larger than the contest success of the attacker.
The attacker knows the performance of each element and seeks to maximize the expected damage.
Assumption 1: Both agents distribute their efforts equally across the functionally identical elements.
This assumption is relevant in situations where the attacker cannot direct the attack exactly against certain
targets (for example, low precision missile attack against a group of separated targets) and the defender cannot
protect only a subset of targets (for example in the case of anti-aircraft defense in the area where the targets are
located). In such situations one should assume that both the attacker and the defender distribute their effort evenly
among the elements.
Assumption 1 applies for the first four propositions in this section. Lacking information, the attacker distributes
his effort evenly among the elements. This means that the attacker makes no strategic decision, and thus has no
strategic decision variable. The attacker thus plays no game in the beginning of this section. Toward the end of this
section, in Proposition 5, the attacker has complete information about the defender’s effort distribution and is able
to direct the attack exactly against certain targets. Then the attacker’s strategy is to attack unprotected elements
with an arbitrarily small but positive effort, and to distribute his remaining resource evenly across the protected
elements.
The vulnerability of any element is determined by a contest between the defender and the attacker. The contest
is expressed as a contest success function modeled with the common ratio form, see [9, 23, 25]. For the case when
both the defender and the attacker evenly distribute their efforts over all N elements, which implies division with N,
the vulnerability of any element is
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where m ≥ 0 is a parameter3 that expresses the intensity of the contest, ∂v/∂R > 0, ∂v/∂ (r – s) < 0. If the attacker
exerts high effort, he is likely to win the contest which gives high vulnerability. If the defender exerts high effort, he
is likely to win the contest which gives low vulnerability. Since the agents have limited budgets, and separation is
costly for the defender, there are limits to how high efforts the agents exert.
Analogously to the formulation by [9], [12, page 30] and [24, page 102], the defender has a resource r
transformable into two kinds of efforts. The first is separation effort s designed to separate the system into N
elements. The second is protective effort r-s aimed at protecting the elements. The defender allocates the same
resource ri for protection of each one of identical elements of type i, and Ni ri  to protect the group of elements of
type i. Proportional protection cost is often realistic since more elements take up more space, which means that
more protective casing or a larger bunker is required. Analogously, the attacker has a resource R transformable into
an attack on the system. The attacker attacks each element of type i with resource Ri, and attacks the group of
elements of type i with resource Ni Ri . After allocating the attack and the protection resources to elements of type i
for 1≤ i ≤ n–1, the resource remaining to attack and protect each element of type n is
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which follow by implication since r and R are fixed. The strategic choice variables ri and Ri for 1≤ i ≤ n–1, and rn
and R
n
 in (2), jointly provide the connection between effort and resource consumption for each agent. Though
separation requires the attacker to spread its attack across a larger number of separated elements, the decreased
amount of resources available for the defender to defend each element makes each element more vulnerable, despite
the decreased attack effort against each element.
The vulnerability vi of the group of elements of type i is
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where the parameter m is the same for all elements of any type. In contrast to equation (1), equation (3) holds when
the defender and attacker distribute their efforts unevenly across the N elements. We interpret the resources as
normalized resources. Assume that the defender transforms its resource ri measured in some currency into protective
effort x times as efficiently as the attacker transforms its resource Ri measured in the same currency into attack. In
order for ri and Ri to be matched as efforts against each other in the contest success function, the attacker must have
x times as much of its resource in the given currency as does the defender. Analogously, assume that the defender
transforms its resource ri measured in some currency into protecting one of the Ni elements y times as efficiently as
it transforms its resource rj measured in the same currency into protecting one of the Nj elements, i, j = 1,…, n, i ≠ j.
In order for ri and rj to operate in the same calculation, the defender must allocate y times as much of r to constitute
rj compared with constituting ri. The same normalization applies for transforming r into separation s. This means
that although r, ri, s, R, and Ri, i = 1,…,n, may be similar when measured in some currency, they may be different
when accounting for the efficiency by which each agent transforms its resource into effort [9, 12, 24].4
For N identical elements, the probability that k out of N elements are destroyed by the attacker is kNk vvk
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This means that the damage is proportional to the cumulative system performance, proportional to the element
vulnerability, and independent of the number N of elements. The expected system performance is G – D = G(1–v).
If the vulnerability is 0, the damage is 0, and the expected performance is G. If the vulnerability is 1, the damage is
G, and the expected performance is 0.
Proposition 1: Separation of homogeneous elements with even allocation of the defender’s effort is not beneficial
for the defender.
Proof: Separation only increases the expected damage, with no added benefit. The proof is a special case of the
proof of Proposition 2, shown below.
Without separation the expected damage of the system is
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The logic of (6) is that we determine the vulnerability vi of an element of type i, and multiply it with the performance
Ni gi of all Ni elements of type i. The expected damage follows from determining and summing this expression
across all n groups.
Proposition 2. If the ratio between the defender’s and attacker’s resources allocated to protect and attack an
element of type i is the same for any i and equals the total resource minus separation cost, divided by the attacker’s
total resource, ri /Ri=(r – s)/R, i=1, … , n, then the vulnerability is the same for all elements of all types, separation
is not beneficial, and the expected damage is
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Proof: Inserting ri /Ri = (r – s)/R into (3) gives vi = Rm/[(r – s)m + Rm]. Inserting into (6) gives (7). Separation is
not beneficial since the expression for D in (7) with separation is always larger than the expression for D without
separation in (5) for any s > 0.
Since D in (7) is always larger than D in (5), separation is not beneficial when ri / Ri = (r – s)/R, i= 1, …, n. Two
examples of Proposition 2 are resource allocation proportional to the sizes of the groups of identical elements, i.e.
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Clearly, separation is not always ineffective. For example, inserting n = 2, N1 = N2 = m = r = R = 1, r1 = 0.98,
r2 = 0.01, s = 0.01, R1 = 0.01, R2 = 0.99, g1 = 2, g2 = 1 gives the expected damage D = 1.0102 with separation in (7).
Without separation in (5) the expected damage is D = 1.5. Hence with these assumptions the defender prefers to
separate. The reason for this result is that the defender protects the high performing elements heavily, while the
attacker attacks the low performing elements. Although such an example may sound unlikely, it may occur in
practice when the defender and attacker are incompletely informed about each other.
Comparing (6) and (5), separation is efficient if
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For n = 2 types of elements with sizes N1 and N2, (8) can be written as
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Solving with respect to s gives
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wheres is the upper acceptable separation cost which justifies separation. In order for the defender to justify the
separation cost, he must furnish a contest success on each element that in an overall sense is sufficiently larger than
the contest success of the attacker. The defender’s contest success may be lower on some elements than on other
elements, but it must be sufficiently higher on at least some elements. The inequality (10) is somewhat hard to
interpret. One simplification is to assume that the defender is somehow able to maintain its contest success against
the attacker for all elements of type 1. This means that r1/R1 = r/R. However, inserting this gives s < 0, as expected,
which means that separation is never efficient.
Proposition 3: With two different types of elements, the defender can never justify separation by maintaining
its contest success against the attacker for one type of elements. To possibly justify separation, the contest success
must be decreased against one type and increased against the other type.
Proof: Follows from inserting r1/R1 = r/R into (10) which implies s < 0 which means that no separation cost can
be incurred to defend elements of type 2.
Proposition 3 implies that the defender must choose lower contest success for one type of elements and higher
contest success for the other type of elements. To make a clean study of this, assume that r1 = 0 which means that the
defender chooses not to protect any of the elements of type 1.
Proposition 4: Assume two types of elements and that the defender chooses not to protect any of the elements
of type 1, r1 = 0. The defender prefers to incur the cost s of separation when
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which is satisfied when N1 is large or R1 is large, regardless of r, R, m, or when (R/rm) is moderately larger than
N1g1/N2g2 for appropriate parameter values.
Proof: Equation (11) follows from inserting r1 = 0 into (10). First, when N1R1 is large, regardless of r, R, m, the
term multiplied with the ratio in (11) is small which makes the RHS in (11) positive and somewhat smaller than r,
which justifies s up to this value. Second, (R/r)m = N1g1/N2g2 causes division with zero in the ratio which causes the
RHS to be negative. Third,
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< 0 is also negative. But, for example R = r and N1g1/N2g2
= 1/2 givess = r (1– 3 1/m) + 31/m N1 R1 which is positive for many parameter values. One example is m = r = N1 =
R1 = 1 which givess = 1.
Proposition 4 shows that the defender can justify the separation cost when many elements N1 are not defended,
without the attacker knowing this so that R1 is chosen high. This is possible only when the attacker is incompletely
informed.
Assumption 2: The attacker has complete information about the defender’s effort distribution and can choose
any distribution of his effort across the elements. The defender has no information about the attacker’s effort
distribution and assumes that the attacker for any defender’s strategy can respond with resource distribution that
maximizes the damage to the system.
This assumption is realistic in a two period game where the defender chooses strategy in the first period, the
attacker chooses strategy in the second period, and the attacker is able to direct the attack exactly against certain
targets. If the attacker is completely informed about the defender not defending the N1 elements, he benefits from
investing an arbitrarily small but positive amount R1 to attack each of the N1 elements.
Proposition 5: Assume that the defender chooses not to protect any of the elements of type 1, r1 = 0. If the
attacker knows this, he invests an arbitrarily small but positive amount R1 = 0+ into attacking each of the N1 elements.
The consequence is that the defender cannot justify the separation cost.
Proof: Inserting R1 = 0 into (11) gives
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The numerator in the ratio is always larger than the denominator and hence is negative.
3. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION WITH RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
This section also assumes fixed resources r and R for the defender and attacker.
Assumption 3: The defender and attacker make their strategic choices simultaneously and independently. Both
agents can choose any distribution of their effort across the elements.
Assumption 3 applies for the remainder of the article, and means that the defender and attacker play a simultaneous
game with each other. This means that neither agent knows the other agent’s strategy before choosing its own
strategy. The defender does not know how the attacker distributes its resource across the n types. The attacker
knows that the system exists and has N functionally identical parallel elements of n types, but does not know how
the defender distributes its resource across the types and how much of the resource is distributed to separation. The
defender seeks to minimize his expenses caused by investments into the defense and the expected damage, that is
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In contrast, the attacker seeks to maximize the expected damage. Hence we model the attacker’s utility as
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The defender has n–1 strategic decision variables r1, …, rn–1. The attacker has n–1 strategic decision variables
R1, … , Rn–1. For the defender, rn follows from (2) when r is fixed, and is thus not a strategic decision variable.
Analogously, for the attacker, R
n
 follows from (2) when R is fixed, and is thus not a strategic decision variable. The
two agents choose their strategic decision variables independently and simultaneously. In order to differentiate with
respect to r1 and R1 for the first type of elements, we write the utilities in (14) and (15) as
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The first order conditions for the set of elements of type 1 are
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The second order conditions for the set of elements of type 1 are
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Observe the joint occurrence of the same kinds of terms in the two expressions in (18) and (19). Careful solution of
the two equations gives
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Inserting (22) into the first order condition for the defender or attacker and solving gives
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Rearranging terms gives
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Performing the same analysis as above for the second type of elements analogously gives R
n
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n
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we generally have
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Inserting (25) into (23), simplifying, and generalizing from type 1 to type i, gives
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Inserting into (22) gives r1 = g1rn/gn. Hence generally
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Inserting into the definition of r and solving with respect to r1 gives
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Generalizing from type 1 to type i gives
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Inserting (26) and (29) into the second order conditions in (20) and (21) gives
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Generalizing from type 1 to type i gives
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which are satisfied as negative when
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Inserting (26) and (29) into (3), the vulnerability vi of type i is
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Proposition 6. With resource constraints, resource investments of both defender and attacker for a given type
of elements are proportional to the performance of that type. The defender and attacker allocate their resources so
that the vulnerability of each type is the same. The vulnerability increases in the contest intensity m.
Proof: Follows from equations (26), (28), (35).
Inserting (35) into (14) and (15), the utilities are
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The attacker’s utility in (36) reveals that the same expected damage as in (7) applies, which implies the following
proposition.
Proposition 7. With resource constraints, separation is not beneficial.
Proof: Follows from comparing (36) and (5) which gives equal expected damage with and without separation
when s = 0.
4. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION WITHOUT RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND WITHOUT SEPARATION
Assume that the defender and attacker have unlimited resources. The defender incurs an effort t, which is the
defender’s strategic choice variable, at unit cost a of protecting the system. The attacker incurs an effort T, which is
the attacker’s strategic choice variable, at unit cost A of attacking the system. The vulnerability v of the system is
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The expected damage of the system is
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where we use the same performance definition G =
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∑  as in the previous section to allow for comparison. The
defender seeks to maximize the utility
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The first order conditions are
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Inserting t = AT/a into the second order conditions gives
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which are satisfied as negative when
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Inserting (42) into (39) and (40) gives the
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Proposition 8: Without resource constraints and without separation, the defender withdraws from the contest
over the system when m > 1 + (A/a)m. The attacker withdraws when m > 1 + (a/A)m. If both these are satisfied, the
agent with the highest unit cost of effort, a or A, withdraws. The agent that withdraws earns zero utility, while the
other agent earns utility G and exerts arbitrarily small but positive effort. If m > 2 and a = A, the agents are tied at
effort t = T = G/2 and utilities u = U = 0.
Proof: Follows from (45) when u < 0 or U < 0.
To illustrate that an agent withdraws from contests over elements that contribute to negative utility, which is
only possible when the contest intensity m is large, we can rewrite (45) as
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Inserting a = A = 1 into (37), (42), (45) gives
1 1
1 (2 )
, ,
4 2 4
n n
i i i i
i i
m m
t T N g v u U N g
= =
−
= = = = =∑ ∑ (47)
5. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION WITHOUT RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND WITH SEPARATION
Assume that the defender and attacker have unlimited resources, and separate as in section 3. The total system
performance is G =
1
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i i
i
N g
=
∑ . The defender incurs an effort ti (defender’s strategic choice variable) at unit cost ai of
protecting each element of type i, and incurs s as separation cost. The linkage between this section and the previous
one is that t =
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∑ , which sums up the protection across all elements to get the protection of the system. The
attacker incurs an effort Ti (attacker’s strategic choice variable) at unit cost Ai of attacking each element of type i,
where T =
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N T
=
∑ . Different unit costs ai and Ai for different types of elements reflect different vulnerabilities for
different types of elements. Note that ai and a, and Ai and A, are often comparable in size since these are unit costs,
and not actual costs which are reflected by ti and Ti for elements and t and T for the system. The vulnerability vi of
the group of elements of type i is
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The expected damage has the same expression as in section 3, i.e.
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but vi is now modeled differently. The defender seeks to maximize the utility
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The first order conditions for the set of elements of type i are
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Inserting ti = AiTi /ai into the second order conditions gives
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which are satisfied as negative when
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Inserting (53) into (50) and (51) gives the utilities
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Proposition 9. Without resource constraints, the defender withdraws from the contest over element of type i
when m > 1 + (Ai/ai)m. The attacker withdraws from the contest over element of type i when m > 1 + (ai/Ai)m. If both
these are satisfied, the agent with the highest unit cost of effort, ai or Ai, withdraws. The agent that withdraws earns
zero utility for that element, while the other agent earns utility Nigi for that element and exerts arbitrarily small but
positive effort for that element. If m>2 and ai = Ai, the agents are tied at effort t=T=Nigi/2 and earns zero utilities
over element i. Additionally, when the separation cost s is so large that the utility u is negative, the defender
withdraws from all contests and does not separate.
Proof: Follows from (56) when u < 0 or U < 0.
Observe the similarity between Propositions 8 and 9. Proposition 8 assumes no separation and is valid for the
system as a whole. In contrast, Proposition 9 assumes separation, and is valid for each element, as well as for the
system as a whole. To illustrate that an agent withdraws from contests over elements that contribute to negative
utility, which is only possible when the contest intensity m is large, we can rewrite (56) as
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There are many ways in which the defender can divide the overall separation cost s into separation cost si for
each element of type i,
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= ∑ . One possibility is si = sNi
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∑ , but the cost can also be divided influenced
by the parameters ai, Ai, m. If the defender decides to design such a cost division formula for separation, si can be
incorporated inside the summation sign in the defender’s utility in (56) to determine from which contests the
defender prefers to withdraw.
Inserting ai = a and Ai = A into (56) gives
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Inserting a = A = 1 gives
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which can be compared with (47). Note in particular how gi in the expression for ti = Ti in (59) corresponds to
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∑  in the expression for t = T in (47), and how the utilities are equal aside from the separation cost.
6. ASSESSING SEPARATION EFFICIENCY WHEN DEFENDERAND ATTACKER ACT OPTIMALLY
WITHOUT RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
Comparing the defender’s utility with separation in (57) with the defender’s utility without separation in (46),
separation is efficient if
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which can be rewritten as
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Proposition 10: Assume no resource constraints. (1) When ai = a and Ai = A for all i= 1, …, n, separation is not
efficient. (2) Separation is efficient when ai/Ai is smaller than a/A for sufficiently many of the n types of elements so
that (61) is satisfied.
Proof: (1) Inserting ai = a and Ai = A into (61) gives s < 0. (2) Equating the two ratios in (61) gives a second
order equation with two roots
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The second root does not apply since it is positive only when m is so large that the numerator in the second ratio
in (61) is negative which unacceptably gives negative utility. Hence the first root applies. The denominator of the
first ratio is smaller than the denominator of the second ratio when ai/Ai < a/A. The parenthesis in (61) is multiplied
with Ni gi, which means that the inequality is more easily satisfied for those elements where Nigi is large.
Proposition 10 implies that the defender is willing to undertake the separation if lower unit costs of defense can
be obtained through the separation process for sufficiently many of the elements so that (61) is satisfied. Especially
important are elements with high performance (gi is large), or if there are many of them of the same type (Ni is
large). This means that the defender’s benefit of lower unit costs of defense for these important elements outweighs
the separation cost.
Let us consider an example. First, inserting m = 1 into (61) gives
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Second, inserting n = 3 and a/A = 1 into (63) gives
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Third, inserting a1/A1 = 1/2, a2/A2 = 2/3, a2/A2 = 4/3 into (64) gives
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The inequality is most easily satisfied when N1g1 and N2g2 are large, and N3g3 is small.
7. CONCLUSION
The article considers strategic defense and attack of a system which consists of functionally identical parallel
elements of n types with different performance. The elements can be separated and protected. The defender distributes
its resource between separation and protecting the elements from outside attacks. Separation leaves fewer resources
for protecting each separated element, but prevents simultaneous destruction of all the elements. The protection of
elements of the same type is the same. The defender distributes its resource between separation and protecting the
elements from outside attacks. The vulnerability of each element is determined by an attacker-defender contest
success function.
Ten propositions are developed. The first seven propositions assume resource constraints. First, separation of
homogeneous elements with even allocation of the defender’s effort is not beneficial for the defender. Second, if the
ratio between the defender’s and attacker’s resources allocated to protect and attack an element of type i equals the
total resource minus separation cost, divided by the attacker’s total resource, then the vulnerability is the same for
all elements of all types, and separation is not beneficial. An example is presented which illustrates that separation
can be efficient. The example is such that the defender protects the high performing elements heavily, while the
attacker attacks the low performing elements. Third, with two different types of elements, the defender can never
justify separation by maintaining its contest success against the attacker for one type of elements. To possibly
justify separation, the contest success must be decreased against one type and increased against the other type.
Fourth, for the case of two types of elements a condition is developed for the highest separation cost the defender is
willing to incur if it chooses not to protect any of the elements of type 1. Fifth, if the attacker knows that the
defender chooses not to protect any of the elements of type 1, the attacker invests arbitrarily little to attack type 1
elements. The consequence is that the defender cannot justify the separation cost.
Sixth, introducing utility maximization and assuming resource constraints, the resource investments of both
defender and attacker for a given type of elements are proportional to the performance of that type. The defender
and attacker allocate their resources so that the vulnerability of each type of elements is the same. The vulnerability
increases in the contest intensity m. Seventh, in this case separation is not beneficial.
Eighth, without resource constraints, without separation and when the contest intensity is sufficiently high, the
agent with the highest unit cost of effort withdraws from defending/attacking the system, earning zero utility, while
the other agent earns maximum utility. Ninth, without resource constraints and with separation, the agent with the
highest unit cost of effort for one specific element withdraws from defending/attacking that element. Additionally,
when the separation cost is so large that the utility is negative, the defender withdraws from all contests and does
not separate. Tenth, without resource constraints, separation is not efficient if the unit costs of defense are equal for
all elements, and the unit costs of attack are the same for all elements. However, separation is efficient if lower unit
costs of defense can be obtained through the separation process for sufficiently many of the elements, especially
those elements with high performance, or if the number of elements of the same type is large.
NOTES
1. See [8] for an analysis where one agent defends each component in a system, [13] and [10] for interdependence between
components, and  [20], [27], [28], and [22] applying game theory for  components in isolation. See [11] for defense and
attack of series and parallel systems.
2. The term functionally identical (or functionally equivalent) is used to state that the elements perform the same task sharing
the work. The elements can differ by their characteristics (performance, reliability, cost etc.) The examples are: generating
system consisting of different generators (they can be even of different nature: coal steam generators, diesel turbines etc.);
computer grid consisting of different types of processors sharing a computation task.
3. When m = 0, the agents’ efforts have equal impact on the vulnerability regardless of their size which gives 50% vulnerability.
0 < m < 1 gives a disproportional advantage of investing less than one’s opponent. When m =1, the investments have
proportional impact on the vulnerability. m > 1 gives a disproportional advantage of investing more effort than one’s
opponent (economies of scale). Finally, m = ∞ gives a step function where “winner-takes-all”.
4. See [9], [12] and [24] for examples of modeling different efficiencies of transforming resources into effort.
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